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Allen: How to Think About Errors, Costs, and Their Allocation

SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE
HOW TO THINK ABOUT ERRORS, COSTS, AND THEIR ALLOCATION
Ronald J. Allen
There is an ongoing, robust debate about the structure of litigation,
and in particular, about access to the courts. For a considerable period
of time, the mantra that the courts should be readily available to all the
people so that people may present claims that their rights have been
violated has dominated academic discourse and has, perhaps,
significantly influenced the structure of litigation.1 This conventional
view—that the courts should be freely open to all—was dealt a blow by
the Iqbal2 and Twombly3 decisions, which imposed greater gatekeeping
responsibilities on the federal district courts. These decisions
predictably provoked a storm of protest, in large measure because they
may indeed make it more difficult for many petitioners to have their
petitions considered on the merits.4 But whether that result is a social
harm or a social good depends on matters aside from simply winnowing
the field of potential disputants—a point neglected by much of
contemporary civil procedure scholarship. That scholarship has placed a
laser-like focus on facilitating the bringing of claims, and in doing so,
has made two serious errors: first, the scholarship fails to consider that
litigation is but one small part of a larger social optimization problem;
and second, the scholarship has a peculiar conception of errors and
costs, including how to allocate those errors and costs. This brief Article
provides the analytical background to these assertions.
“Primary behavior” and “litigation behavior” are conventionally
thought of as distinct spheres with internal logics of their own. The
former articulates rules governing everyday actions—from social
interaction to structuring efficient economic behavior—and the latter
governs the peculiar set of actions involved in litigation. Facilitating
appropriate primary behavior is the overriding goal of social
organization, and one of its main tools is substantive law. Litigation
behavior is the effort to resolve disputes about inappropriate primary
behavior or to reestablish the status quo following disruptions of the
social fabric.
 John Henry Wigmore Professor of Law, Northwestern University; President, Board of
Foreign Advisors, Evidence Law and Forensic Science Institute, China University of Political
Science and Law.
1. See Arthur Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 3–5 (2010).
2. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
3. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
4. See, e.g., Symposium, Reflections on Iqbal: Discerning Its Rule, Grappling with Its
Implications, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1143 passim (2010).
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Resources devoted to litigation appear to most legal commentators
as wasted resources—adding no value to society. Since litigation itself
does not produce any useful good, litigation should obtain correct
results as efficiently as possible. These aspirations are reflected in Rule
1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that the rules of
civil procedure “should be construed and administered to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.”5 These aspirations also appear in Rule 102 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence: “These rules should be construed so as to administer
every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the
truth and securing a just determination.”6 The principle animating these
provisions is equal access to justice, particularly that even the indigent
should not be disadvantaged when facing a wealthy adversary.
Regrettably, life, as always, is complicated. Costs cannot be eliminated,
and thus, the most important question is how to allocate those costs.
Primary behavior does not produce goods cost-free; producing
goods creates waste products and risks harm to others. Naturally,
reducing production costs encourages production, whereas raising costs
has the opposite effect. Thus, if the producer can externalize some of its
cost (for example, by dumping waste in a river or on a neighbor’s
property), the producer’s actual cost of the good will not reflect its true
social cost, which means—with regard to social utility—there will
likely be overproduction of the good in question. By contrast, optimal
production of social goods is facilitated by ensuring production at true
social cost. This equilibrium is why it is important for the substantive
law to align costs with behavior.
Litigation costs are generally believed to be socially perverse
because they act as a tax on productive behavior. To some extent, this
belief is true, but a costless legal regime would stimulate the production
of its product—litigation—and possibly result in too much litigation.
Although this may appear counterintuitive, one should remember that
parties must make decisions as to how to dispute—in simple terms,
whether to sue or negotiate. Everyone comes into contact and potential
conflict with numerous people. Perhaps a neighbor plays music too
loudly or neglects to dispose of trash correctly. If litigation were
costless one would simply sue rather than negotiate.7 The costs of
litigation affect the manner in which people relate, and those effects can be
beneficial or perverse. The costs of litigation, in short, may counterintuitively
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
6. FED. R. EVID. 102.
7. When transaction costs for private negotiation and settlement are relatively low,
parties will negotiate with each other to resolve conflicts. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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produce social goods through the incentive effects they create for alternative
modes of disputing.
The precise policy prescriptions following a deeper understanding
of the problem of social cost are ambiguous, because they depend, in
part, on the relative values of resolving different kinds of disputes in
different ways. It may be sensible to guide certain types of disputes
toward formal dispute resolution and to guide others away from it.
Maybe commercial disputes differ from family disputes, and maybe
discrete commercial transactions systemically differ from antitrust
actions. Life, in short, is complicated, and one of the tasks for the legal
system is sorting out that complexity.
The history of both the Federal Rules of Procedure and the Federal Rules
of Evidence reflect, at least implicitly, these analytical points; Congress
enacted them in part to offset what it believed to be distorting aspects of the
systems that they replaced.8 Lawmakers believed the previous systems
disadvantaged plaintiffs by raising their costs much too high.9 The
solution to this problem was to simplify pleading requirements and to
allow cases to proceed to what pundits believed would be low-cost
discovery, followed by low-cost trials.10 Discovery costs would be low
because the assumption was that both parties shared knowledge of the
typical cases, and thus, a substantial investment in discovery would not
be required. In addition, both parties would have the incentive to keep
costs of discovery to their necessary minimum. It is immediately
obvious how these conceptions map onto the previous analytical points.
“In a world of symmetrical information and low transaction
costs . . . the Federal Rules most likely accomplished the goal of
facilitating the accurate and efficient resolution of disputes without
distorting the underlying substantive law, values that the procedural
regime the Federal Rules replaced did not adequately secure.”11 If the
original assumptions about litigation are true, procedural wrangling
serves no purpose.12 Moreover, costs were not, and could not be,
lowered to zero, so there remained reciprocal incentives to avoid
litigation through other means of resolving disputes.
One should note the historical contingency of the era that adopted the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It involved substantive assumptions about
the relative positions of plaintiffs and defendants that were empirically true

8. See Ronald J. Allen & Alan E. Guy, Conley as a Special Case of Twombly and Iqbal:
Exploring the Intersection of Evidence and Procedure and the Nature of Rules, 115 PENN. ST. L.
REV. 1, 7–8 (2010).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 11–12.
12. Id. at 12.
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but not logically entailed.13 Thus, changes in the relative positions of
plaintiff and defendant from the pre-Rules situation may justify changes
in the procedural context, which could entail, among other things, a
reallocation of costs.14 Perhaps originally, the procedural regime
favored defendants and thus subsidized socially wasteful activity;
however, now, in some set of cases, perhaps this regime favors
plaintiffs with the opposite effect.15
In such cases, defendants will be deterred from productive
activities, not by the law, but by litigation costs that
increase the in terrorum [sic] value of even meritless suits
that put pressure on a defendant to settle and burden
otherwise lawful conduct. Potential defendants will engage
in litigation avoidance tactics that are likely to be socially
wasteful, and they will settle to avoid litigation costs rather
than risk liability on the merits.16
The high price of litigation increases the cost of socially useful activity
that is indistinguishable from socially costly activity at an acceptable
price through litigation.17 The alternative is to buy peace through
settlements even though the underlying primary behavior is perfectly
acceptable. The effect is a tax on useful behavior.
To generalize, the legal system must take into account the
interactive effects of primary behavior and litigation behavior. The
effects or consequences of primary behavior on litigation behavior are
often noted, but litigation behavior affects primary behavior as well.18
This means that the regulatory problem is unlikely to be solved by
simple slogans such as those concerning access to court. Before
addressing how to approach regulating such a complex problem,
another issue involving the inadequacy of the conventional
understandings of the litigation matrix needs to be addressed. In
addition to inadequately considering the relationship between primary
behavior and litigation behavior, the conventional conception of an
error is inadequate.
The conventional conception of an error is composed of two parts:
denying a petitioner access to an adjudication on the merits (through

13. Id. at 11–13.
14. Id. at 13–14.
15. Id. at 14.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary Effect of Evidence
on Primary Behavior, 124 HARV. L. REV. 518, 547–48 (2010) (arguing that evidentiary concerns
about prospective litigation have pervasive effects on primary behavior).
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narrowing the courthouse door)19 and a belief that Type I (false
positive) and Type II (false negative) errors20 are roughly equivalent.
These parts add up to suggest that the procedural goals should be to
treat parties roughly equally and to minimize total errors. 21 Although
these ways of thinking have been around for a considerable period, it is
plain that they suffer from serious defects.
First, an error is made each time an undeserving litigant imposes
costs on an adversary, a point that seems, rather remarkably, to have
been neglected by those who complain of the Supreme Court’s recent
forays into procedural matters. The image of the federal court system
(or any other court system, for that matter) being constantly open and
easily accessible for all neglects that walking through the courthouse
door by a plaintiff imposes costs on a defendant. If the defendant has
behaved inappropriately by reference to the substantive law, the
defendant should bear these costs. But as elaborated above, if the
defendant has not behaved inappropriately by reference to that same
substantive law—if a plaintiff’s claim is unjustified—the costs imposed
on defendants are errors that create taxes on productive behavior and
thus are likely socially perverse. This point is so obvious that it needs
little further elaboration. An undeserving plaintiff deprives a deserving
defendant of its assets, and the best-case scenario is that the deserving
defendant passes those costs on to a hapless public. The best-case
scenario, in short, is decidedly unappealing. The point, of course, is that
the conventional view seems dominated by the belief that there are no
wrongful complaints filed, which is ludicrous. More importantly, in an
era of asymmetrical costs, where filing a complaint can generate
enormous costs for the defendant, the defendant will be consistently in
the position discussed above, having to minimize extra costs attached to
socially useful behavior, and having to pass whatever costs it cannot
avoid on to someone else, if possible.
There is a second fundamental error in the conventional thinking
about errors. It focuses on just two of the decisions that a court can
reach at trial—an error for one side or the other—but there are four
possible outcomes at trial, and all have social benefits or costs. In
addition to errors, correct decisions are possible. Neglecting correct
decisions is peculiar. For example, in civil cases, the error equalization
19. See Miller, supra note 1, at 9–10 (discussing how changes in litigation strategy and
judicial interpretation of the Federal Rules have influenced a “retreat from the principles of
citizen access” to courts).
20. For more on Type I and Type II errors in connection with pleading standards, see
Allen & Guy, supra note 8, at 6–7.
21. See, e.g., David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard:
Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 7 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 487,
488, 496–500 (1982).
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policy is satisfied by making errors in every single case, so long as the
base rates of cases that go to trial include roughly the same number of
deserving plaintiffs and defendants.
The relationship between the four possible outcomes at trial and
procedural regulation is itself more complicated than it appears on the
surface. In general, without knowledge of the base rates of deserving
parties that go to trial and the relationship between the assessments of
fact-finders and true states of affairs, there is literally no way to predict
the effect of procedural regulation on correct or incorrect decisions. For
example, implicit in the conventional discourse is that a finding that the
probability of liability is 0.8 means that in eight out of ten similar cases,
the true facts are consistent with liability. However, there could be any
relationship between fact-finders’ findings of probability and true states
of affairs. In the set of all cases where fact-finders find a 0.8 probability
of liability, it could be true that all cases in that subset are cases factfinders should find no liability. Similarly, if everyone who goes to trial
is guilty or liable, there can be no convictions of the innocent or
mistakes against deserving plaintiffs, no matter how low the standard of
proof, and vice versa.
The conventional discourse on procedural regulation also assumes a
static system, whereas in fact it is dynamic. One aspect of this
dynamism is that parties decide which cases to take further into the
procedural system and can adjust their decision in light of changes in
the rules. Thus, the simple assumption that changing the burden of
pleading or persuasion, or any other part of procedure, causes more
errors of one kind than another, or any other suggested cause-and-effect
relationship between regulations and outcomes, is obviously not
analytically true; it depends on how the system responds to the change.
The combined effect of the neglect of the interactive relationship
between primary and litigation behavior and the curious conception of
an error is obvious. The result is to obscure the fact that trial decisions
are only one part of the output of the legal system. Parties negotiate
outcomes in both civil and criminal cases. They do so in the shadow of
trials (among other things), but the outcomes in those cases are
obviously part of the total social welfare effects of a legal system. In
addition, parties make those decisions in a dynamic, not a static,
environment, which leads to the question how to regulate such complex
processes most effectively.
In the abstract, the answer is clear. How to translate the abstractions
into feasible regulation is another matter. First, the abstract answer is
addressed in the quote below from my recent Meador Lecture, which is
followed by my further reflections on social optimization of the
procedural system:

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss4/1

6

Allen: How to Think About Errors, Costs, and Their Allocation

2012]

HOW TO THINK ABOUT ERRORS, COSTS, AND THEIR ALLOCATION

891

[T]he reality of the legal system is that it is not a nice, tidy,
simple, and static context but instead is a bubbling cauldron
of messy, complicated, organic, evolutionary processes.
The standard tool used to regulate this bubbling mess is
rules, and it is the friction between that tool and many of
the uses to which it is put that explains in general why factfinding and legal regulation are viewed as so often
problematic. This same relationship is explanatory of many
legal puzzles, such as, in ascending order of importance,
the curious implications of standard legal error analysis, the
rules versus standards debate, and the meaning of “law.”
The simple concept of a rule as setting necessary or
sufficient conditions from which outcomes may be deduced
is an example of monotonic logic in which the addition of
postulates or assumptions simply adds to what may be
deduced from the previous assumptions. Monotonic logics
are powerful tools, as the rise of modern mathematics and
the success of many scientific fields demonstrate. They
work best when their operant assumptions accurately
capture their domains, which means they work quite well,
in Hayek’s famous dichotomy, in made systems such as
games, and less well in grown or organic systems, which
typify much of the human condition. A large part of debate
over rules and their limits is often implicitly about the
complexity of the relevant domain and one’s tolerance for
mistakes of different kinds. As the number of pertinent
variables increases or when some of them are continuous
rather than discrete, the deductive problem quickly
becomes computationally intractable, even for computers
let alone humans. And of course if a new variable pops up
that was not previously anticipated, all deductive bets are
off, as it were. In either case (computational intractability
or failure of imagination), algorithmic approaches that rely
on extant rules generate the standard critiques of the
indeterminate nature of rules. In reality, it is not that rules
are indeterminate but that they are being put to a task for
which they are not optimal.22
That lecture suggested that the central problem of the legal system is
similar to the central problem of rationality, which is the taming of
complexity. In both cases, simple deductive tools were being put to uses
that were suboptimal. That raises the important question of what other
22. Ronald J. Allen, Rationality and the Taming of Complexity, 62 ALA. L. REV. 1047,
1060 (2012) (footnote omitted).
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approaches may be more fruitful. Inspired by a brilliant article by an
artificial intelligence researcher, Tim van Gelder, I explored one
possible answer. The struggle of rationality to tame complexity may be
less like digital computation and more akin to a dynamic regulator, such
as the Watt Centrifugal Governor that was a critical part of the
Industrial Revolution.23 Analogously, legal analysis may need to evolve
to deal with the complexities of systems. Van Gelder’s example is a
metaphor rather than an argument for my purposes, for it provides just
the suggestion of possibilities rather than a defined research program.
Nonetheless, it is interesting.
The dynamic regulator solved a very interesting problem. The
growth of the textile industry in England depended upon a consistent
energy source with very limited variability.24 The steam engine
provided the energy but its pistons provided episodic bursts of energy
rather than a smooth, continuous stream.25 Flywheels were helpful, but
still not adequate. As van Gelder made clear, one potential solution to
this problem is computational:
1. Measure the speed of the flywheel.
2. Compare the actual speed against the desired speed.
3. If there is no discrepancy, return to step 1.
Otherwise,
a. measure the current steam pressure;
b. calculate the desired alteration in steam pressure;
c. calculate the necessary throttle valve adjustment.
4. Make the throttle valve adjustment.
5. Return to step 1.26
Unfortunately, this computational solution requires a costly person
doing it, and it will rarely produce a smooth enough source of energy.27
Scottish engineer James Watt solved this problem by placing movable
arms on a spindle at the center of the flywheel. The flywheel’s motion
was instantaneously transmitted to the valve regulating the flow of
steam.28 As the rotation of the flywheel speeds up, the arms extend,
which transmits energy to the valve and closes it until the proper
equilibrium is reached, and vice versa.
Regardless whether the centrifugal regulator captures something
important about rationality, viewing the legal system with this metaphor
23.
(1995).
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Tim van Gelder, What Might Cognition Be, if Not Computation?, 92 J. PHIL. 345
Id. at 347.
Id.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 349.
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in mind may be fruitful. The most dramatic point is that some problems
can be solved other than through deductive arguments or simple rules;
the contrary belief is a consistent constraint on legal scholarship
generally. It is undoubtedly useful to break problems down into smaller
parts, and so on, but at the same time that process can be
counterproductive, disguising rather than highlighting the nature of the
entity under examination. The alternative is to think of the legal system
more, perhaps, like fluid dynamics treats the flow of liquids and gases,
to embrace, in other words, the messiness of real life rather than abstract
it away.
How does this apply in the procedural context? Telling trial judges
to behave as centrifugal regulators in order to optimize social
productivity is probably not likely to yield satisfactory results. The
second-best solution would be to assign the true costs of parties’ actions
to them. However, it is impossible to determine—practically and maybe
theoretically—the “true” costs of litigation behavior. For example,
when I ask for discovery, I may be trying to build my case or respond to
the opponent’s case. I should be responsible for building my case, but
responding to my opponent’s case perhaps is a cost that he should bear.
When a lawyer cross-examines, whose costs are those? If it is pointing
out the limits of the adversary’s case, he should bear those costs; but if
through cross-examination I am building my case, I should bear those
costs. How could procedural law sort these different effects into the
categories that are useful for one side or the other? A crude rule—
opposing party pays for my costs of cross-examination—leads to
obvious potential manipulation. Nor is adopting a British-style loserpays system an obvious solution. Recent empirical work shows both
that simple predictions about the effect of a loser-pays system are likely
false (in fact, it can increase transaction costs), and that people do not
opt for the English rule in contract negotiations.29
Alternatively, the objective could be to structure the process so that the
parties have the incentive to properly allocate costs, with, when necessary,
the involvement of the trial judge. That objective would involve categorical
cost allocation, with the possibility of relief from the trial judge. One
category probably ripe for such treatment is discovery costs. Discovery
costs generally benefit the party asking for the discovery, and discovery
has been a cause of considerable injustice because of increasingly

29. Kong-Pin Chen & Jue-Shyan Wang, Fee-Shifting Rules in Litigation with Contingency
Fees, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 519, 522–23 (2007); Keith N. Hylton, Rule 68, the Modified British Rule,
and Civil Litigation Reform, 1 MICH. L. & POL. REV. 73, 74 (1996); see also Theodore Eisenberg &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The English vs. the American Rule on Attorneys Fees: An Empirical Study of
Attorney Fee Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts 1 (NYU Law & Econ. Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 10-52, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1706054.
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asymmetric allocation.30 Plaintiffs, simply by filing, can impose
enormous costs on defendants while bearing virtually none
themselves.31 One should note how far from the original conceptions
giving rise to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the modern condition
may be. If each side will have about the same amount of discovery
costs, it makes perfect sense to let each side bear their own costs. That
is identical to cost shifting, and any resources spent in shifting costs are
simply wasted. Asymmetric costs, by contrast, cause skewed cost
allocation and provide the opportunity for strategic exploitation. By
contrast, placing the costs of discovery provisionally on the person
asking for it, but allowing for judicial involvement to make adjustments,
may both generally give incentives for the optimal production of
information and permit a safety valve in the unusual case.
Although the possibilities are diverse, an example of an “unusual”
case would be where there is good reason to believe that an adversary is
acting strategically, primarily to impose costs. In such a case, the
“benefit” is to the adversary, and that is who should bear the costs. The
optimal cost shifting would be accomplished by petitioning the trial
judge for relief. In making such determinations, the adversarial process
will construct the judge’s decision, and the parties will have the correct
incentives to educate the trial judge. This is not a guarantee of
perfection, but it provides some hope for reasonable outcomes. It
exploits the advantages of both an initial “bear your own costs” scheme
with the apparent inertia of trial courts that do not want to get involved
with cost allocation or discovery regulation unless forced to do so.
Courts would be forced to be involved only when the situation was
egregious enough to justify a well-grounded petition for relief.

30. See Frank Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 636–37 (1989)
31. Id.
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